Using a sequential model of multilateral bargaining involving one buyer and two sellers, who are selling objects which are imperfect compliments for the buyer, we analyse buyer's preferred bargaining order i.e. whether the buyer prefers to buy higher valuation object first or second. For a narrow range of parameters, where players are patient enough and objects exhibit high degree of complimentarity, multiple equilibria exist such that both the bargaining orders are preferred. For rest of the range, which is relatively much larger, buyer prefers to buy higher valuation object first.
Introduction
We analyse a model of multilateral bargaining in which one buyer negotiates with two sellers, each of whom own an unit object. These objects are imperfect complements ie each object is valuable to the buyer, however owning both the objects is the most desirable. We consider a general case in which one object is more valuable to the buyer than the other. Using a sequential bargaining model we attempt to know which bargaining order buyer prefers ie would he like to buy from the seller holding more valuable object first or from the seller holding low value object first. We characterize the conditions under which buyer prefers one order over the other. For most of the range of parameters, buyer prefers to buy higher valuation object first. However, for a narrow range of parameters, multiple equilibria exist such that some support one order, while the rest support the other order. Our main results are captured in the propositions 6 and 7.
While most of the literature on multilateral bargaining concerns with inefficiency and multiplicity of equilibria 1 , Xiao(2010), Shubhro(2016) , and Krastiv and Yildrim (2009) study bargaining order. Using different models, Xiao(2010) and Shubhro(2016) characterize the conditions under which buyer prefers one seller over another. Note that the bargaining order in these papers is based on the sellers' valuation of their objects, while in ours it is based on the buyer's valuation of the objects. Hence, in our model the objects cannot be perfect compliments, while they are in Xiao(2010) and Shubhro(2016) . Krastiv and Yildrim (2009) study buyer's preferred bargaining order based on the bargaining power of the sellers which is measured as their chance of being the proposer in a one shot bargaining with the buyer. Key features of our model are sequential bargaining of infinite periods and binding offers. Both these features are quiet the norm in multilateral bargaining literature.
2 In next section we describe the model, which we analyse in section 3. We conclude in the section 4.
Model
One buyer negotiates with two sellers, denoted by s 1 and s 2 , to buy each of the objects owned by them. Both objects are imperfect complements. Buyer's utility from owning the objects is the following. v(1)=u < 1, v(2)=0 and v(1,2)=1, where v(1), v(2) and v(1,2) are buyer's utility when he owns s 1 's object, s 2 's object and both the objects respectively. The bargaining game consists of infinite rounds. Each round has a maximum of two periods, in first of which the buyer makes an offer to a seller and the seller responds with acceptance or rejection of the same. In the second period of the round, the seller demands a price (counter-offer) and the buyer responds. The buyer switches to the other seller in the next round. Hence, the game may possibly continue for infinite rounds (and periods). If an offer or counter-offer is accepted, the buyer makes the payment to the respective seller, who in turn leaves the game, and the game enters the next round. Game ends when the buyer buys both the objects. All players are risk neutral and discount at the rate of δ ∈ (0, 1) per period. We use Markov Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium, henceforth equilibrium, as the solution concept.
Analysis
Following two lemmas are the minor results.
Lemma 1.
Perpetual disagreement is not possible in equilibrium.
Proof. See Cai (2000, lemma 4).
Lemma 2.
In every equilibrium, the buyer buys both the objects in consecutive periods.
Proof. Consider an equilibrium. The buyer must acquire an object, say in period t. This follows from the lemma 1. The subsequent subgame is a Rubinstein(1982) game with immediate outcome. Hence, the second object is obtained by the buyer in the period t+1.
We now analyse the game in which the buyer negotiates with the seller 1 in the first period. Following five propositions characterize all the equilibria of the game. The proofs follow same methodology as employed in Shubhro(2016) , from which we borrow the following notations as well.
An equilibrium profile is described by 8 parameters-
Buyer offers o 1 to seller 1 in the first period.ô 1 is the minimum offer from the buyer which the seller 1 is willing to accept. In the second period, seller 1 counter-offers co 1 to himself. The buyer rejects any counter-offer more thanĉ o 1 from the seller 1. Similarly, in third period, buyer offers o 2 to seller 2, who accepts any offer at least as much asô 2 . The seller 2 counter-offers co 2 to himself in the fourth period. The buyer rejects any counter-offer more thanĉ o 2 from the seller 2.
Equilibrium payoff is denoted by {p b , p 1 , p 2 , t}, where the first three terms are the payoffs to the buyer, the sellers s 1 and s 2 respectively as seen from period t. We chose the period of the first purchase as t. Note that the counting of the periods start with 1 ( not 0).
following strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium. We denote this equilibrium by E 1 .
, following strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium. We denote this equilibrium by E 2 .
, following strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium. We denote this equilibrium by E 3 .
Equilibrium payoff is
, following strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium. We denote this equilibrium by E 4 .
Proposition 5. For u(1−δ 4 ) ≤ δ 3 +δ 5 −δ−δ 8 , following strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium. We denote this equilibrium by E 5 .
See the appendix. Figure 1 summarizes the above propositions (equilibria). Note that in the equilibrium E 1 all the offers and counter offers are accepted. The equilibrium E 1 exists for low values of δ or high values of u. When players are impatient, they would not like to wait, and they would be eager to make deals as soon as possible. Hence, E 1 exists for low values of δ. Whereas E 2 to E 5 exist for high value of δ, and consequently some of the offers and counter offers are rejected. In E 2 , all the offers and counter-offers are accepted except for co 2 , which is rejected. In E 3 , both the offers are accepted, while both the counter-offers are rejected. In E 4 , o 1 and co 1 are accepted, while o 2 and co 2 are rejected. In E 5 , o 1 and co 1 are rejected, while o 2 and co 2 are accepted.
Note that the above propositions (1 to 5) also characterize the set of equilibria of the game in which buyer starts the negotiations with the seller s 2 . Only difference is that of the payoffs. By comparing these payoffs, we can evaluate buyer's preferred bargaining order. Following two propositions present the corresponding results, which are the main findings of this paper. Proposition 6. For For u(1 − δ 4 ) ≥ δ 3 + δ 5 − δ − δ 8 , the buyer prefers to buy from s 1 , the seller with higher valuation object, first.
Proof. In the parameter range defined above, equilibrium E 1 , E 2 , E 3 and E 4 are applicable. See figure 1. It can be verified that buyer obtains higher payoff if he buys from s1 first in all these equilibria. See the appendix for calculations.
Proposition 7. For For u(1 − δ 4 ) ≤ δ 3 + δ 5 − δ − δ 8 , there exist equilibria such that both the bargaining orders are supported.
Proof. In the parameter range defined above, equilibria E 3 , E 4 and E 5 overlap. See figure 1 . In E 3 and E 4 , the buyer obtains higher payoff if he buys from s1 first. In E 5 , the buyer obtains higher payoff if he buys from s 2 first. See the appendix for calculations.
Clearly, buyer prefers to buy high utility object first, except when players are sufficiently patient and objects are sufficiently closer to being perfect compliments (i.e. low u), in which case there exists equilibria such that both the bargaining orders are supported. The intuition behind the result is following. In the zone where both the bargaining orders are supported in equilibrium, there exist two equilibria such that in each of them, one of the sellers hold out ie unwilling to sell first. Hence each equilibrium supports one of the bargaining orders. The reason a seller holds out is the lucrative Rubinstein(1982) 
. If he waits and sells second, the bargaining is over a surplus of unity. Clearly, for high enough u, the waiting is unlikely to be lucrative. If s 2 sells first, he is bargaining over a surplus of δ 1+δ , which is discounted value of the payoff available to the buyer in the Rubinstein bargaining with s 1 . If he holds out and goes second, he is bargaining over a surplus of 1 − u. Clearly, for high u, selling second is not lucrative for s 2 . Hence, only when δ is high and u is low enough, the sellers have incentive to hold out and obtain the Rubinstein payoff. Hence the multiple equilibria supporting both the bargaining orders exist in the corresponding zone.
Conclusion
We study a model of multilateral bargaining in which a buyer attempts to buy objects from two sellers. The objects are imperfect compliments for the buyer. We enquire buyer's preferred bargaining order ie whether buyer prefers to buy the higher valuation object first or the lower valuation object first. For most of the range of the parameters, buyer prefers to buy higher valuation object first. However, for a narrow range of parameters which involves high discount factor and high degree of complimentarity, multiple equilibria exist such that both the bargaining orders are supported.
Appendix
Proof of proposition 1 It is an infinite game, in which the game repeats after every 4 periods. Since we focus on Markov SPNE only, the strategies repeat after every 4 periods. Hence, we need to describe equilibrium strategies for first 4 periods only. In the first 4 periods a total of 4 offers and counter-offers are made. Hence, depending upon various combinations of offers and counter-offers being accepted or rejected, the total number of possible outcomes is 2 4 = 16. Out of these 16, only 5 outcomes (E 1 to E 5 ) are possible in equilibrium. The remaining 11 outcomes are not possible in equilibrium. Let us construct equilibrium E 1 (described in proposition 1) in which all the 4 offers and counter-offers are accepted. We use following 8 steps (a to h) to construct the equilibrium. These 8 steps give us values of 8 parameters and 4 inequalities. These 8 parameters are o 1 ,ô 1 , co 1 ,ĉ o 1 , o 2 ,ô 2 , co 2 , andĉ o 2 (see section 3 for the description of these parameters). The 4 inequalitites are the constraints to which the equilibrium is subjected. When these 4 inequalities together represent an area or a line or a point, the equilibrium exists, otherwise the corresponding "equilibrium" does not exist. This is how it can be shown that 5 out of 16 outcomes exist as equilibria, and the rest of 11 outcomes do not form equilibria. 1+δ + δu − δo 1 . By equating x and y, we get an equation forĉ o 2 . x = y =⇒ĉ
b) Consider period 4. Since all 4 offers and counter-offers are accepted in E 1 , co 2 must be accepted. Therefore, the seller s 2 must counter-offer the maximum the buyer accepts. This implies,
What is the s 2 's payoff if he counter-offers more thanĉ o 2 ? The current period is wasted since the counter-offer is rejected by the buyer. In the next period the buyer pays o1 to seller 1 (as all 4 offers and counter-offers are accepted in E 1 ). In the next period, the s 2 receives the Rubinstein payoff of x =
1+δ . Since the seller counter-offers himselfĉ o 2 , following inequality must hold.
c) Consider period 3. Since s2 receivesĉ o 2 in period 4, he will reject any offer below δĉ o 2 in period 3. Therefore,ô
d) Consider period 3. Since o 2 is accepted in E 1 , we have,
What is the buyer's payoff when he offersô 2 ? Buyer paysô 2 = δĉ o 2 in the current period and obtains Rubinstein payoff of 1 1+δ in the next period. His net payoff is x = δ 1+δ − δĉ o 2 . What is the buyer's payoff if he offers less thanô 2 ? In that case, his offer is rejected. In the next period, he paysĉ o 2 to s2. In the subsequent period he obtains the Rubinstein payoff of 1 1+δ . His net payoff is y = δ 2 1+δ − δĉ o 2 . Since the buyer offersô 2 , following inequality must hold.
Above inequality is true for all values of δ. 
f) Consider period 2. Since all 4 offers and counter-offers are accepted in E 1 , co 1 must be accepted. Therefore, the seller s 1 must counter-offer the maximum the buyer accepts. This implies,
What is the seller's payoff if he counter-offers more thanĉ o 1 ? The current period is wasted since the counter-offer is rejected by the buyer. In the next period the buyer pays o 2 to seller 2 (as all 4 offers and counter-offers are accepted in E 1 ). In the next period, the s 1 receives the Rubinstein payoff of x = δ 1+δ . Since the seller counter-offers himselfĉ o 1 , following inequality must hold.
g) Consider period 1. Since s1 receivesĉ o 1 in period 2, he will reject any offer below δĉ o 1 in period 1. Therefore,ô
h) Consider period 1. Since o 1 is accepted in E 1 , we have,
What is the buyer's payoff when he offersô 1 ? Buyer paysô 1 = δĉ o 1 and receives u in the current period and obtains Rubinstein payoff of + δu − δĉ o 1 . Since the buyer offersô 1 , following inequality must hold.
The above inequality is true for all values of δ and u.
We have 8 equations, numbered 1 to 8, in 8 variables, which upon solving gives us the values of o 1 ,ô 1 , co 1 ,ĉ o 1 , o 2 ,ô 2 , co 2 , andĉ o 2 . Also, we have 4 inequalities, labeled I.1 to I.4. Inequalities I.2 and I.4 are true for entire range of parameter values of u and δ. Hence, these inequalities can be ignored. After substituting the values of variables, the inequalities I.1 and I.3 become -
It can be verified that the first inequality makes the second inequality redundant. Hence, E 1 is confined to the area represented by the first inequality.
Proof of propositions 2 to 5
Using arguments similar to those used in the steps a to h in the proof of the proposition 1, propositions 2 to 5 can be proved. Using same methodology it can be shown that the rest of the 11 outcomes out of 16 possibilities cannot be supported in equilibrium.
Proof of propositions 6 and 7
Bargaining order 1 refers to the game in which s 1 is the first seller to negotiate with the buyer. Similarly, bargaining order 2 refers to the game in which s 2 is the first seller to negotiate with the buyer. Let B 1,i and B 2,i denote buyer's payoff in bargaining order 1 and 2 respectively in the equilibrium E i . Now we compare buyer's payoffs in both the bargaining orders in each of the equilibria.
Substituting the value of o 1 − o 2 in the equation 9, we get, u 1+δ > δu 1+δ 2 =⇒ 1 > δ , which must be false because of our assumption. This is a contradiction since we know that the statement is true for all values of δ. Hence our assumption must be false, and the claim must be true.
(ii) Claim:
Because of our assumption, the above inequality, equation 10, must not hold over the entire range of parameter values for which E 2 is applicable. 1+δ 6 −δ−δ 4 . Statement C: It can be verified that y > 1 for δ ∈ [δ 1 , 1), and y < 0 for δ ∈ (δ 0 , δ 1 ). Also, it can be verified that E2 exists for δ ∈ (δ 0 , 1). Statement A, B and C together proves that the inequality (equation 10) holds for the entire range of the parameter values for which E 2 is applicable. This proves the claim by contradiction. Let us assume that B 1,3 > B 2,3 is false. This implies that 1 > δ 4 is false, which is a contradiction. This contradiction means that our assumption is false. Hence, the claim is proved by contradiction. 2 is false, which is a contradiction. This contradiction means that our assumption is false. Hence, the claim is proved by contradiction.
